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INTRODUCTION
Every U.S. jurisdiction has created a separate body of law to
address workplace injuries - the workers’ compensation scheme. These
no-fault systems provide employees injured on the job lost wages and
medical benefits. It also immunizes employers from negligence claims
arising out of most workplace accidents. This article discusses a grow-
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ing phenomenon in Florida’s workers’ compensation scheme, the use of
estoppel to negate employer immunity.
In some instances, employers have attempted to avail them-
selves of tort immunity while simultaneously refusing to acknowledge
that an accident is covered under workers’ compensation. Employees
could thereby have been denied any recovery, contrary to a legislative
intent to internalize the cost of doing business. In these instances,
Florida courts have applied the doctrine of estoppel, holding that em-
ployers may not assert workers’ compensation immunity while
simultaneously denying workers’ compensation liability.
Unfortunately, some Florida courts have ignored or misinter-
preted precedent and allowed estoppel-based claims to go forward
without the required showings. This has weakened the protection of-
fered by workers’ compensation immunity, contrary to another
legislative mandate: to avoid litigation of work injuries in the circuit
courts.
This article lays out the various theories of estoppel—primarily
judicial and equitable—that may be asserted in the context of on-the-
job injury litigation. This article goes on to explain why Florida courts
should refrain from application of equitable estoppel in employee tort
actions. Instead, workers’ compensation litigation should be allowed to
take its course and judicial estoppel applied when injuries are held to
be non-compensable.
I. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: A PRIMER
In Florida, injuries sustained in the course of employment are
governed not under the law of torts, but under a separate body of law
known as “workers’ compensation.” Similar schemes have been
adopted in every U.S. state. Some states, including Florida, rely on
variations of the traditional private insurance model. Other states
have chosen to adopt a government-administered scheme, generally
funded by employer contributions like unemployment benefit funds.1
Professor Larson lays out the general theory of workers’ compensation
law as follows:
[T]he basic operating principle is that an employee is automatically
entitled to certain benefits whenever [the employee] suffers a “per-
sonal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
1. These are sometimes referred to as “monopolistic” jurisdictions. See, e.g., Monopo-
listic State Funds: Glossary of Insurance and Risk Management Terms, INT’L RISK MGMT.
INST., INC., http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/m/monopolistic-state-
funds.aspx (last visited Aug. 23, 2015).
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employment” or an occupational disease . . . [n]egligence and fault
are largely immaterial, both in the sense that the employee’s con-
tributory negligence does not lessen his or her rights and in the
sense that the employer’s complete freedom from fault does not
lessen its liability . . . [t]he employee and his or her dependents, in
exchange for these modest but assured benefits, give up their com-
mon-law right to sue the employer for damages for any injury
covered by the [workers’ compensation] act . . . .2
The underlying purpose of such programs is to ensure that the
industry bears the burden of providing for injured workers without the
cost and complexity of tort litigation.3 To this end, the employer is im-
mune from suit in tort for covered injuries, while the employee need
not prove fault to receive medical and lost wage benefits.4 This quid
pro quo, sometimes called the “workers’ compensation bargain,”5 is the
basis of all American workers’ compensation systems.6 The U.S. Su-
preme Court resolved the constitutionality of such enactments for
federal purposes in 1917.7
Florida’s workers’ compensation scheme was first enacted in
1935, and is codified today at Chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes—
“the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law.”8 Notwithstanding the stat-
utory designation, the chapter is often styled as the “Workers’
2. LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERI-
ALS, AND TEXT 3-5 (4th ed. 2008).
3. See, e.g., C.F. Wheeler Co. v. Pullins, 11 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1942).
4. See Lee v. Fla. Pine & Cypress, 157 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1963). Workers’ compensa-
tion legislation also generally provides for death and dependency benefits, as well as
rehabilitation and vocational benefits. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.16 (death and dependency ben-
efits); FLA. STAT. § 440.491(6)(b) (retraining benefits).
5. See, e.g., Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 790 A.2d 884, 887 (N.J. 2002); Mo. Alliance
for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 675 (Mo. 2009);
Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054, 1062 (Cal. 1990); Yuille v. Bridgeport Hosp., 874 A.2d
844, 846 (Conn. 2005). Curiously, the phrase “workers’ compensation bargain” is never used
by Florida courts, which favor the less descriptive quid pro quo. E.g., Bruno v. Destiny
Transp., Inc., 921 So. 2d 836, 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (heard in the Second District).
6. One notable exception to mandatory workers’ compensation schemes is the state of
Texas, where workers’ compensation is a permissive system. Private employers “may elect”
workers’ compensation coverage. “Nonsubscribing” employers do not enjoy the benefit of the
bargain; that is, they are liable to employees in tort under ordinary negligence principles.
TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 406.002 (1993); See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Robinson, 280
S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. 1955).
7. In Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917), and N.Y. Cent. R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), the U.S. Supreme Court found that New York and Washington’s
workers’ compensation laws were reasonable exercises of state police powers.
8. FLA. STAT. § 440.01 (2012). This gender-neutral terminology was adopted in 1979,
in favor of the previously favored “Workmen’s Compensation Law.” See 1979 Fla. Laws c.
79-40, § 1.
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Compensation Act” by courts and practitioners.9 The legislative intent
is to provide for “the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medi-
cal benefits to an injured worker and to facilitate the worker’s return to
gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer.”10 The leg-
islature also provided that “[t]he workers’ compensation system in
Florida is based on a mutual renunciation of common-law rights and
defenses by employers and employees alike.”11 The constitutionality of
the Workers’ Compensation Act in terms of the Florida Constitution
has been litigated several times, but has not been seriously questioned
by an appellate court since 1978.12
A. The Florida Workers’ Compensation System
An employee who sustains a workplace injury must request
medical care and lost wage benefits from his employer.13 The majority
of workers’ compensation claims are never litigated,14 as the system is
designed to be “self-executing,” meaning employers are expected to pro-
9. E.g., “[u]nder Florida’s Worker’s Compensation Act (“the Act”), an employer who
secures worker’s compensation coverage for his employees receives extensive immunity
from suit . . . .” Byers v. Ritz, 890 So. 2d 343, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (heard in the
Third District). All Florida District Court of Appeal decisions cited herein are from the First
District, except as otherwise noted.
10. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2012). See also Blount v. State Rd. Dept., 87 So. 2d 507, 512
(Fla. 1956) (“The [Workers’ Compensation Act] is designed to afford a speedy and summary
disposition of claims and we know the working man ordinarily cannot afford to wait indefi-
nitely to receive compensation for himself and his family when he has been injured and
forced to quit work.”).
11. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2012).
12. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1978). Specific
provisions of the Act have been challenged on constitutional grounds many times since,
most notably the fee shifting provisions discussed infra note 29. Most recently, the First
District Court of Appeal struck down a 104-week limitation on temporary lost wage benefits
in Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). A trial court
in Florida’s Eleventh Circuit struck down the Workers’ Compensation Act in its entirety in
Fla. Workers’ Advocates v. State of Florida, No. 11-13661 CA 25 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13,
2014). However, the employee-challenger who argued that the act was unconstitutional was
essentially unopposed in that proceeding. The decision is now on appeal in the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, with various intervenors set to argue for the act’s constitutionality.
See State of Florida v. Fla. Workers’ Advocates, 167 So. 3d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
13. FLA. STAT. § 440.09. Most Florida employers are required to obtain workers’ com-
pensation insurance coverage. The scope of this mandate is defined at FLA. STAT. § 440.02
(2015).
14. There is not an exact correlation between attorney representation and litigation, as
some unrepresented claimants litigate and some represented claimants do not. However, a
recent study by the Workers’ Compensation Research Institute found that 23% of injured
workers in Florida retained attorneys. See Denise Johnson, Why Workers’ Comp Claimants
Hire Attorneys, CLAIMS J. (May 17, 2012), http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/
2012/05/17/207003.htm.
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vide workers’ compensation benefits without the need for litigation.15
This self-executing system places the initial burden of determining
compensability on employers and their insurance carriers.16 “Compen-
sability” refers to the determination of whether an accident was work-
related (that is, whether an “employment relationship” existed, and
whether the accident arose within the course and scope of that rela-
tionship).17 Assuming the employer/carrier determines a compensable
accident has occurred,18 it must then determine if medical or indem-
nity (wage loss) benefits are due. As a general matter, such
determinations are made by an adjuster assigned to the case, with or
without supervisory input. The processes involved are informal and
few procedures are mandated.19 At any given stage, an aggrieved em-
15. See O’Neil v. Dep’t of Transp., 468 So. 2d 904, 906 (Fla. 1985).
16. “The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter
if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work per-
formed in the course and the scope of employment.” FLA. STAT. § 440.09. The majority of
workers’ compensation claims in this state are administered by workers’ compensation car-
riers or their third party administrators. Even self-insured employers largely farm out
claim administration to third party administrators. As a result, in workers’ compensation
litigation, the parties are generally styled as the “employee” or “claimant,” and “the em-
ployer/carrier” or “employer/carrier/servicing agent.” For the purposes of this article, the
parties are generally referred to as the employee and the employer/carrier. Most cited refer-
ences herein follow this convention, or customary abbreviations such as “E/C.” See Carroll v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 286 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (“From the beginning our courts
have, so far as immunity in the sense used here is concerned, considered ‘employer and
insurer’, ‘employer-carrier’ in the same context. The courts, the administrative agencies
under the Act, and members of the bar have consistently and constantly considered them as
interchangeable words . . . .”).
17. “In failing to deny compensability, the E/C only admits that there was an industrial
accident resulting in some injury to the worker.” Checkers Rest. v. Wiethoff, 925 So. 2d 348,
349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See also N. River Ins. Co. v. Wuelling, 683 So. 2d 1090, 1092
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“ ‘[C]ompensability’ in the context of sections 440.192 and 440.20
is limited to a determination of whether the injury for which benefits are claimed arose out
of, and occurred within the course and scope of, the claimant’s employment.”). Confusingly,
compensability is often used in reference to the employer’s liability for a certain benefit, but
it does not have this meaning under the Act. See, e.g., Babahmetovic v. Scan Design Fla.,
Inc., No. 1D14-2986, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 6493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 1, 2015) (“This
error came about by the JCC’s conflating the existence and cause of the injury—compen-
sability—with the existence and cause of the need for treatment.”).
18. Although the vast majority of workers’ compensation cases involve discrete “acci-
dents,” such as falls, occupational disease cases and repetitive trauma injuries are also
subsumed within the body of workers’ compensation law. See, e.g., Festa v. Teleflex, Inc.,
382 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (explaining methods of proving exposure the-
ory of accident).
19. Most required procedures involve the filing of reports. For example, if an employer/
carrier denies compensability or “entitlement to any benefit,” it must file a form entitled
“DWC-12,” or “Notice of Denial,” with the Division of Workers’ Compensation. See FLA. AD-
MIN. CODE r. 69L-3.012 (2014). Because the Notice of Denial generally sets forth the grounds
on which an employer/carrier is denying a claim, it may be sufficient in and of itself to
support an assertion of estoppel. This will be discussed in greater detail below.
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ployee may informally raise a dispute with his employer or the insurer;
seek assistance from the Bureau of Employee Assistance and
Ombudsman (“EAO”);20 or, initiate litigation.21
Litigation of workers’ compensation claims occurs in an admin-
istrative setting before specialist administrative hearing officers, the
Judges of Compensation Claims (JCCs).22 No jury is involved, and the
JCC acts as both fact finder and arbiter of questions of law.23 Proceed-
ings before JCCs are less formal than conventional civil trials, and
while rules of procedure and the Florida Evidence Code24 apply,25 their
application is somewhat relaxed:
In making an investigation or inquiry or conducting a hearing, the
judge of compensation claims shall not be bound by technical or for-
mal rules of procedure, except as provided by this chapter, but may
make such investigation or inquiry, or conduct such hearing, in
such manner as to best ascertain the rights of the parties.26
20. The EAO is an entity established under FLA. STAT. § 440.191 (2002), to assist em-
ployees pursuing formal or informal remedies. It does not function as a “gatekeeper” like the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and it may not represent employees in formal
adversarial proceedings.
21. “Any employee may, for any benefit that is ripe, due, and owing, file with the Office
of the Judges of Compensation Claims a petition for benefits which meets the requirements
of this section . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 440.192(1).
22. The Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims has original jurisdiction over all
workers’ compensation claims arising in the state of Florida, or under an employment con-
tract made within the state. The Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims is a sub-office
of the Division of Administrative Hearings within the Department of Management Services.
FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (2012).
23. “[T]his court has fashioned the correct rule by which the JCC, as finder of fact, is to
be guided.” Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Dep’t, 625 So. 2d 868, 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
24. The Florida Evidence Code is outlined in Chapter 90 of the Florida Statutes.
25. Workers’ compensation proceedings are governed by the Rules of Procedure for
Workers’ Compensation Adjudications, which are codified at FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 60Q-6.101
(2006). See, e.g., Tutor Time Child Care/Learning Ctrs. v. Patterson, 91 So. 3d 264, 265 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that FLA. STAT. § 440.29(4) (2011) exempts certain medical
records from hearsay and authenticity requirements of the evidence code).
26. The language in FLA. STAT. § 440.29(1) (2011) appears to vest JCCs with certain
inquisitorial powers akin to those of a judge in a civil law jurisdiction, beyond the inherent
power of all trial judges to conduct independent legal research. See Carmack v. State Dep’t
of Agric., 31 So. 3d 798, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). In at least one case, the First District
Court of Appeal has interpreted the section as not merely a description of the JCC’s author-
ity, but a mandate requiring its exercise. See CVS Caremark Corp. v. Latour, 109 So. 3d
1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that employer/carrier’s failure to cite supporting
authority did not justify denial of its otherwise meritorious motion as the JCC had “an inde-
pendent obligation to research and be familiar with the law governing the issues presented
. . . .”).
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Parties may choose to be represented by counsel.27 Fee shifting provi-
sions allow employees to recover attorney’s fees from employers if they
prevail in litigation.28
Discovery in workers’ compensation proceedings is largely simi-
lar to discovery in civil actions.29 The primary differences are the
prohibition of certain discovery vehicles30 and the JCC’s authority to
compel discovery even where no claims are pending.31
Workers’ compensation litigation is scalable. There are three
“levels” of dispute in workers’ compensation matters, whether or not a
matter is in litigation: first, whether the workplace accident occurred
at all, including the determination of whether the injured party was an
employee; second, whether the employer is liable for any benefits, not-
withstanding the occurrence of an injury; and third, whether the
employer is liable for a particular benefit.32 Thus, a JCC may be called
on to adjudicate the compensability of an entire accident, to determine
whether benefits are due generally, or merely to rule on whether an
employee is entitled to an individual benefit. In any event, a final mer-
its hearing before a JCC is almost invariably a shorter affair than a
civil trial.33 The genesis of any workers’ compensation litigation is the
filing of a petition for benefits, which is the equivalent of a civil com-
27. See FLA. ADMIN CODE r. 60Q-6.104.
28. The fee shifting provision is codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.34.
29. The workers’ compensation rules incorporate the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
pertaining to most discovery matters. For example, per FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 60Q-6.114(2)(a)
(2014), “[d]epositions of witnesses or parties may be taken and used in the same manner
and for the same purposes as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.”
30. By rule, workers’ compensation litigants may utilize depositions, issuance of sub-
poenas, and requests for production. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 60Q-6.114(1) (2014). However,
parties may not propound interrogatories or undertake discovery by any other method not
“specifically authorized by statute.” See Hagans v. Gatorland Kubota, LLC/Sentry Ins., 45
So. 3d 73, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
31. “[A] JCC has jurisdiction to compel the production of documentary evidence, even
before the filing of a [formal claim].” Covell v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 118
So. 3d 991, 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). FLA. STAT. § 440.30 (2015) also specifically autho-
rizes the taking of depositions “prior to the institution of a claim.”
32. At all three levels, the JCC may find that one or more affirmative defenses applies
that limits or eliminates the employer’s liability. For example, a claimant who is found to
have committed workers’ compensation fraud is not entitled to workers’ compensation bene-
fits regardless of compensability. Leggett v. Barnett Marine, Inc., No. 1D14-4432, 2015 Fla.
App. LEXIS 8562, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 4, 2015).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 199-202.
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plaint.34 The petition lists the specific benefits to which the employee
claims entitlement and which are alleged to be in dispute.35
For several reasons, there is a tendency on the part of employ-
ers/carriers—the “defendants”—to stipulate to certain matters that
the plaintiff would be required to prove in the context of a civil action.36
A statutory twenty percent penalty on late payments of indemnity ben-
efits and the desire to avoid excessive attorney’s fees or sanctions are
the most obvious reasons to stipulate to facts not in dispute.37 Another
is to ensure defenses are narrowly tailored to the facts, for reasons that
will be made clear below.38 The parties will almost invariably stipulate
to the date and place of accident (at least for ministerial purposes), and
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
The workers’ compensation “trial” is called a final merits hear-
ing.39 The nature of workers’ compensation claims more or less limits
the number of parties at a hearing to two.40 Thus, there are likely to be
no more than three party witnesses: the employee, a representative of
the employer, and a representative of the insurer. Due to the short
34. “An employee or claimant seeking an award of benefits commences a new case by
filing a petition for benefits pursuant to Section 440.192, F.S., when there is not an existing
case pertaining to the same employee and date of accident . . . . When the employee and date
of accident are the same as in an existing case, any subsequent petition for benefits or claim
relating to that employee and date of accident shall be filed in the existing case. FLA. ADMIN
CODE r. 60Q-6.105(1).
35. FLA. STAT. § 440.192 (2011).
36. “[I]t is the policy of law to encourage and uphold stipulations in order to minimize
litigation and expedite the resolution of disputes.” Citrus World, Inc. v. Mullins, 704 So. 2d
128, 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). Under FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 60Q-6.113 (2014), the parties
are required to “[s]tipulate to such facts and the admissibility of documentary evidence as
will avoid unnecessary proof” in the form of a joint pretrial statement. Alternatively, the
parties may attend a pretrial conference for the same purpose.
37. See FLA. STAT. § 440.20(6)(a) (2013). A victorious employee’s attorney will be enti-
tled to a larger employer/carrier paid fee, since time spent proving facts that should not
have been at issue will be chargeable. The defense attorney’s fees will also be increased if
the employer requires strict proof of collateral matters, since the defense attorney will need
to attend additional depositions and the like. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 60Q-6.125 (2012) allows
JCCs to impose sanctions, including fees and costs, for frivolous claims and defenses.
38. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
39. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4)(b) (2011) refers to the trial as a final hearing. However,
practitioners, JCCs, and the appellate courts almost invariably refer to the hearing as a
final merits hearing. E.g., “[b]ecause these claims were ripe at the time of the first final
merits hearing, they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.” U.S. Block Windows v.
Dixon, 943 So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). On appeal, a JCC’s summary final
order is reviewed according to the same standard as a summary judgment. Id.
40. Circumstances in which three or more parties may appear include cases involving
subcontractors, as well as coverage disputes between employers and carriers. E.g., Gomez
Lawn Serv., Inc. v. Hartford, 98 So. 3d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). Such situations are
rare, constituting perhaps one percent of all litigated cases.
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statutory time frames in which litigation must occur, expert witnesses
almost always testify by deposition under Florida Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1.330(a)(3).41 After hearing testimony and argument, and
considering documentary evidence, the JCC enters a compensation or-
der disposing of the claims and defenses.42 This order sets forth the
judge’s determination on compensability, if applicable, and on entitle-
ment to any claimed benefits.43 Issues may also be disposed of via
summary final order, which is akin to summary judgment in a civil
action.44 Perhaps the most unique feature of workers’ compensation lit-
igation is that entry of an order on the merits may not end litigation
even if no appeal is taken. That is, unless the JCC’s order denies com-
pensability or finds that no benefits will be due in the future, the
employee is free to file new claims as they mature.
[W]orker’s compensation cases are, of necessity, taken up piece-
meal. Such cases require this treatment because the various
entitlements of the claim mature at different times as the course of
recovery progresses. The import of this principle is that claims for
various benefits may be treated as they mature, while determina-
tion of immature claims is necessarily postponed until they are
ripe.45
The doctrines of res judicata and law of the case will not bar such sub-
sequently filed claims so long as they were not ripe at the time of the
prior adjudication, and are not based on the same questions of fact or
law.46
Prior to 1979, workers’ compensation trial proceedings were
heard by judges of industrial claims, and the first avenue of appeal for
41. These time frames are prescribed by law, though they may be waived. See FLA.
STAT. § 440.25(4) (2011).
42. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4)(d) (2011).
43. Id.
44. “Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Q-6.120(1) permits a JCC to enter a summary
final order when the order would be dispositive of the issues raised by the petition, and
there are no genuine issues of material fact.” Thomas v. Eckerd Drugs, 987 So. 2d 1262,
1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
45. Fla. Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Parks, 475 So. 2d 1348, 1349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
46. M.D. Transp. v. Paschen, 996 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The se-
quential nature of workers’ compensation proceedings somewhat blurs the line between the
two doctrines and confuses even experienced judges. See also Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juli-
ano, 801 So. 2d 101, 107 (Fla. 2001) (“[T]he doctrines of the law of the case and res judicata
differ in two important ways. First, law of the case applies only to proceedings within the
same case, while res judicata applies to proceedings in different cases. Second, the law of
the case doctrine is narrower in application in that it bars consideration only of those legal
issues that were actually considered and decided in a former [trial or] appeal, . . . while res
judicata bars relitigation in a subsequent cause of action not only of claims raised, but also
claims that could have been raised.”) (internal citations and formatting omitted).
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workers’ compensation matters was to the Industrial Relations Com-
mission.47 In the meantime, JICs were renamed deputy
commissioners, and then Judges of Compensation Claims upon the cre-
ation of the Office of the Judge of Compensation Claims (OJCC).48 The
legislature subsequently abolished the Commission, and jurisdiction
over all workers’ compensation appeals vested in the First District
Court of Appeal in Tallahassee, regardless of the trial venue.49
B. Workers’ Compensation Immunity
Employers enjoy limited immunity to employee tort actions
under Section 440.11 of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act, which
reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Exclusiveness of liability.—
(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in s. 440.10 shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability, including vicarious
liability, of such employer to any third-party tortfeasor and to the
employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or wife, par-
ents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on ac-
count of such injury or death, except as follows:
(a) If an employer fails to secure payment of compensation
as required by this chapter . . .
(b) When an employer commits an intentional tort that
causes the injury or death of the employee . . . .50
The result is that an employee generally cannot maintain a tort action
against his employer, outside the enumerated exceptions.51 In addition
to the statutory exceptions, the legislature and courts have created or
recognized other exceptions. Some exceptions are obvious, such as
claims arising under unrelated statutes;52 others are more nuanced,
47. See Florida Industrial Relations Commission, Industrial Relations Commission Re-
cord Group, Number 000394, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, http://dlis.dos.state.fl.us/barm/rediscov
ery/default.asp?IDCFile=/fsa/DETAILSG.IDC,SPECIFIC%3D979,DATABASE%3DGROUP
(last visited Aug. 23, 2015).
48. Jack A. Weiss, A Primer on Workers’ Compensation Appeals, 80 FLA. B.J. 63 (2006).
49. See FLA. STAT. § 440.271 (2002). For this reason, virtually all appellate decisions
cited to this point are decisions of the First District Court of Appeal.
50. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (2013).
51. Under FLA. STAT. § 440.38 (2004), “secur[ing] payment of compensation” means ob-
taining insurance or authorization from the Division of Workers’ Compensation to act as a
self-insurer. See Limerock Indus. v. Pridgeon, 743 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
52. For example, the Florida Supreme Court has held that civil actions based on work-
place sexual harassment are not barred by the exclusive immunity provision. Byrd v.
Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Fla. 1989).
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such as the “dual persona” doctrine.53 Barring an exception, the em-
ployee’s recovery against the employer is limited to the benefits
specified in Chapter 440.54 In practical terms, this means a negligence
suit filed against an employer may not survive the summary judgment
stage if the employee’s proper recovery is in the workers’ compensation
arena. However, when employers have taken the position that no
workers’ compensation claim exists, courts have rejected the immunity
defense on estoppel grounds, as discussed below.
II. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Lord Coke defined an estoppel as “where a man is concluded, by
his own act or acceptance, to say the truth.”55 Today, we might say
estoppel is found where justice requires that a party be bound by its
own representations. The Florida Supreme Court has defined estoppel
generally as “(1) a representation as to a material fact that is contrary
to a later-asserted position; (2) reliance on that representation; and (3)
a change in position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel, caused
by the representation and reliance thereon.”56 Estoppel is deemed an
avoidance, because its purpose is to avoid or negate an affirmative
defense.57
A. Case Studies
The following fact patterns illustrate how estoppel might arise
in a disputed workers’ compensation claim.
X v. Y & Z - X, a forklift driver, contracted a severe lung disease
after he was allegedly exposed to toxic dust at work. X filed a work-
ers’ compensation claim against Y, his employer, asserting
entitlement to various benefits under the Workers’ Compensation
Act. Z, Y’s insurer, denied the workers’ compensation claim on the
grounds that the lung condition was preexisting and unrelated to
X’s employment. X then voluntarily dismissed his workers’ compen-
53. See, e.g., Percy v. Falcon Fabricators, Inc., 584 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (heard in the Third District).
54. FLA. STAT. § 440.09.
55. 352 Co. Litt. a (SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND, OR COKE UPON LITTLETON (1823)), as quoted in Root v. Crock, 7 Pa. 378, 380
(1847) and elsewhere.
56. Dep’t of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981).
57. See, e.g., Moore Meats, Inc. v. Strawn In and For Seminole Cnty., 313 So. 2d 660,
661 (Fla. 1975) (“In pleading, avoidance means an allegation of new matter in opposition to
a former pleading that admits the facts alleged in the former pleading and shows cause why
they should not have their ordinary legal effect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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sation claim and sued Y for negligently causing him to be exposed
to toxic dust. Y moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
workers’ compensation immunity precluded X’s suit. X responded
that Y was estopped from asserting workers’ compensation immu-
nity, on the grounds that it had denied any causal connection
between the incident and X’s employment.
A v. B & C - A, a printing clerk, received permission from B, her
employer, to take home some empty boxes. She put the boxes on a
loading dock to pick up at the end of her workday. After clocking
out, she left B’s building and walked around the outside to the load-
ing dock. On the way, she tripped on a sidewalk and suffered
numerous injuries in the ensuing fall. She then filed a workers’
compensation claim against B. C, B’s insurer, denied her claim on
the ground that her injury did not arise out of the course and scope
of her employment. A then filed suit against B in tort. B moved for
summary judgment, asserting that A’s sole remedy was in the
workers’ compensation arena. A demurred, arguing that B was es-
topped from asserting immunity since it had denied that the
incident at issue arose from employment.
What factors determine whether either, neither, or both of these estop-
pel arguments will succeed? As discussed above, equitable estoppel
requires a representation by the estopped party, reliance, and change
in position by the adverse party.
Both B and Y took positions in the workers’ compensation
claims, which were inconsistent with those taken in the tort claims.
Both A and X changed their positions based on their employers’ repre-
sentations. Both ensuing tort actions involved the same parties as the
preceding workers’ compensation claims. The voluntary dismissals ar-
guably evidence the employees’ reliance. In fact, in the cases below, we
see that courts have assumed that voluntary dismissals constitute det-
rimental reliance without undertaking any analysis at all. Instead,
they have focused on the degree of inconsistency in employers’
positions.
The first fact pattern (XYZ) is taken from Tractor Supply Co. v.
Kent, in which X is the employee, Francis Kent.58 The Kent court re-
fused to find the employer estopped, after undertaking the following
analysis:
Kent essentially maintains that he was being “whipsawed” out of
any remedy for his injury/illness when TSC denied his claim for
[workers’ compensation] benefits and then subsequently took the
position that Kent’s exclusive remedy was worker’s compensation.
The short answer to this is that Kent could and should have liti-
58. Tractor Supply Co. v. Kent, 966 So. 2d 978, 981-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (heard
in the Fifth District).
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gated the defense of pre-existing injury/illness in the comp action. A
pre-existing injury or illness is a recognized defense to a claim for
comp benefits, section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and should
have been litigated in the comp action.
Kent notes that under Florida law, where injuries are not encom-
passed within our Worker’s Compensation Act, the employee is free
to pursue his or her common law remedies. However, in Williams,
an adjudication of non-compensability had been issued by a judge of
compensation claims. The plaintiff obtained a decision that his
claim was outside the Worker’s Compensation Act and thus, he was
free to pursue his common law remedies.59
The court also held that the denial of workers’ compensation benefits
was not inconsistent with its assertion of immunity: “[t]he carrier did
not assert that no employment relationship existed or that the incident
occurred outside the scope of employment. Rather, the denial asserts
that under the terms of the Worker’s Compensation Act, the injury is
one which is not deemed to be compensable.”60 In other words, the em-
ployer/carrier admitted that Kent sustained a covered accident, but
denied that benefits were due, as Kent’s condition was the result of a
preexisting condition. According to the Fifth District, this type of de-
nial, the second “level” of dispute,61 did not take Kent’s claims outside
the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
The second fact pattern (ABC) is taken from an earlier Fifth
District case, Byerley v. Citrus Pub., Inc.62 Though its facts seem func-
tionally indistinguishable from Kent, the outcome was quite different:
The employer created a Hobson’s choice for Byerley: the employer,
through its insurance carrier, denied her claim for workers’ com-
pensation, and then, when Byerley elected to proceed in a tort
action, argued that she could not sue because her exclusive remedy
was the Workers’ Compensation Act . . . . We think it would be ineq-
uitable for an employer to deny worker’s compensation coverage on
the ground that the employee’s injury did not arise out of the course
and scope of employment, then later claim immunity from a tort
suit on the ground that the injury did arise out of the course and
scope of employment. This argument, if accepted, would eviscerate
the Workers’ Compensation Act and allow employers to avoid all
liability for employee job related injuries . . . .
Byerley accepted and relied on the denial, bore her medical ex-
penses, then sued the employer in tort as permitted by the statute.
Here, the elements of estoppel are shown, and therefore, the em-
59. Id. (internal citations omitted).
60. Id. at 981.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 32-53 (discussing the second “level” of dispute).
62. Byerley v. Citrus Pub., Inc., 725 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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ployer is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the
Workers’ Compensation Act.63
It seems the Byerley court applied the test for equitable estoppel (“By-
erley accepted and relied on the denial, bore her medical expenses,
then sued the employer in tort . . . .”).64 It is unclear from the record
whether Byerley’s workers’ compensation claim was litigated on its
merits. All that is known is that the tort action was filed after the em-
ployer/carrier denied the claim. The Kent court in fact distinguished
Byerley at some length in its own opinion:
The question presented in this appeal is whether Byerley and Elli-
ott establish that an employer such as TSC, who, through its comp
carrier, denies a worker’s compensation claim on the basis that the
injury or illness was pre-existing, is then estopped from asserting
worker’s compensation immunity and exclusivity in defending
against a civil tort action . . . .
The trial court erroneously took the narrow holding in Byerley and
expanded it beyond its supporting rationale. Byerley does not sup-
port application of estoppel principles against an employer who has
raised in the comp proceeding a medical causation defense that the
employee’s medical condition is pre-existing and unrelated to his
current employment.
An essential requisite for invoking equitable estoppel is a represen-
tation by the party sought to be estopped to the other party as to
some material fact, which representation is contrary to the condi-
tion of affairs later asserted by the party sought to be estopped
[citation omitted]. There is no irreconcilable conflict in the employer
here raising a pre-existing medical condition defense to a comp
claim, but asserting it is, nevertheless, insulated from a civil suit
. . . .
Kent’s position is that whenever a comp claim is defended on the
basis that the injury or illness did not result from the claimant’s
employment, the employer is thereafter estopped from asserting in
a civil action the worker’s compensation immunity and exclusivity
defense. Acceptance of this position would force employers and their
carriers to either concede the validity of a comp claim where a pre-
existing condition may be implicated or open themselves up to an
immediate civil action. Byerley does not so hold. Rather, it is only in
taking clearly irreconcilable positions such as in claiming the inci-
dent occurred outside the employment relationship but later
claiming otherwise that an employer runs the risk of being es-
topped to assert comp immunity as a defense to a civil suit.65
63. Id. at 1232-33 (citing Elliott v. Dugger, 542 So. 2d 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
64. Id. at 1232. As discussed above, reliance is an element of other forms of estoppel,
but is not required for judicial estoppel.
65. Kent, 966 So. 2d at 980-81.
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Thus, for the Fifth District, the difference was all in the language of
the denials of the workers’ compensation claims—an analysis which
has largely been approved by its sister courts in the cases discussed
below. In so saying, the wording of the denial in Kent appears to have
been interpreted rather generously to the employer:
TSC’s comp carrier denied Kent’s claim by stating as follows:
“[E]ntire claim denied, as the condition complained of is the result
of a pre-existing medical condition that is not the result of employ-
ment with Tractor Supply.”
This denial was inartfully drafted which likely led the trial court to
focus on the last phrase (“not the result of employment with Tractor
Supply”) when it ruled that the worker’s compensation carrier “de-
nied an industrial accident occurred while in the course and scope
of the Plaintiff’s employment with the Defendant.” However, the in-
tent of the denial is evident. The carrier did not assert that no
employment relationship existed or that the incident occurred
outside the scope of employment. Rather, the denial asserts that
under the terms of the Worker’s Compensation Act, the injury is
one which is not deemed to be compensable.66
Given the procedural posture of the case (i.e., the summary judgment
stage, when all inferences should have been taken in favor of the non-
moving plaintiff), it was probably not for the court to interpret the
plain meaning of the language of the denial.67
In any event, these two cases broadly illustrate the rule gov-
erning such estoppel: it is warranted when the employer denies the
occurrence of an industrial accident, but not when an employer has
merely denied benefits. Although the Kent court referenced the asser-
tion of “a recognized defense to a claim for comp benefits,”68 this
language is not particularly helpful. Asserting that no employment re-
lationship exists is also a “recognized defense” to a claim for workers’
compensation benefits (as workers’ compensation benefits are payable
only by an “employer” on behalf of an “employee,” as defined in Sec-
tions 440.02(15) and (16) of the Florida Statutes, respectively).69
However, it is clear that an assertion that no employment relationship
existed would justify estoppel, as set forth in Byerley.70
66. Id. at 981.
67. See Schroeder v. Peoplease Corp., 18 So. 3d 1165, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009),
discussed at infra note 97.
68. Kent, 966 So. 2d at 981.
69. Conversely, an independent contractor arrangement is not governed by the Work-
ers’ Compensation Act.
70. “The employer argues that Byerley . . . was not an employee at the time the injury
occurred.” Byerley, 725 So. 2d at 1231.
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The Florida Supreme Court has yet to approve or disapprove
the holdings of Byerley or Kent. However, the holdings of the other four
District Courts of Florida are largely consistent, as evidenced by the
cases that follow.
1. The First District Court of Appeal
As noted above, the First District Court of Appeal has exclusive
jurisdiction of workers’ compensation appeals.71 Thus, its interpreta-
tion of Chapter 440 is arguably entitled to some deference from its
sister courts.
The First District appears to have been the first to consider the
argument that estoppel could bar an employer’s immunity defense.72
In Quality Shell Homes & Supply v. Roley, the injured worker was the
employee of a contractor on a construction project.73 The worker fell
from the roof of the building under construction and sustained “seri-
ous” injuries.74 The developer initially indicated that workers’
compensation coverage was available to Roley.75 However, two weeks
later, it recanted and asserted that Roley’s direct employer, the con-
tractor, was responsible.76 The contractor/employer had, in fact, not
obtained insurance because it had relied on the developer’s contractual
agreement to do so.77 Roley then filed suit against the developer, Qual-
ity Shell, and others.78 Rather than disposing of the estoppel issue at
summary judgment, the trial court submitted it to the jury with the
following instruction:
[I]f you find that Workmen’s Compensation Insurance actually ex-
isted, in order for the plaintiff to recover it is necessary that the
evidence establish by a preponderance of it that the plaintiff
changed his position to his detriment by not filing a claim for com-
pensation, as a result of the alleged statement that there was no
such workmen’s compensation coverage, and if the preponderance
71. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
72. Quality Shell Homes & Supply Co. v. Roley, 186 So. 2d 837, 840-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
73. Id. at 839.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Roley is an example of the contractor/subcontractor disputes referenced in
supra note 40.
77. Id.
78. Roley, 186 So. 2d at 839. The other defendants are not identified in the opinion.
Thus, it is unclear whether Roley’s direct employer (who did not change position, but appar-
ently did not have coverage) was also estopped from asserting workers’ compensation
immunity.
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of the evidence does not establish that he did so change his position
as a result of the alleged statement, then he cannot recover in this
suit.79
The First District upheld a subsequent jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, noting that the jury could reasonably have inferred that the
defendants were estopped from asserting immunity.80 Roley is some-
what distinguishable because it appears that the estoppel stemmed
from the denial of coverage, rather than the denial of the claim.
The First District was also the first Florida court to formulate
the rule applied in Byerley/Kent. This rule was described by the court
in sequential appeals stemming from a single workplace incident.81 El-
liott, a corrections officer, was employed by the Florida Department of
Corrections at its Reception and Medical Center in Lake Butler.82 He
alleged that inmates at the facility “spiked” his coffee with a blood
sample containing the AIDS virus.83 Thereafter, Elliott reported inges-
tion of the coffee as a work injury.84 A blood test revealed no evidence
of infection,85 but the incident was reported as a workers’ compensa-
tion claim, and subsequently denied. Elliott then filed suit against the
Department of Corrections, a vendor that provided medical services to
the prison facility, and individuals associated with both.86 The Depart-
ment defended on the ground that Elliott’s sole remedy was workers’
compensation, and moved for summary judgment.87 Elliott argued that
he was entitled to proceed in tort because the employer had denied his
claim for workers’ compensation benefits.88 The specific document de-
nying his claim was not in evidence, but Elliott testified that he
received a letter indicating “no [workers’ compensation] benefits were
79. Id. at 841. The appellate court found this to be a fair statement of the elements of
equitable estoppel. The evidence apparently showed that Quality Shell did have workers’
compensation coverage and merely determined that it did not extend to the accident at is-
sue. Id.
80. Id.
81. Elliott v. Dugger, 542 So. 2d 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) [hereinafter Elliott I];
Elliott v. Dugger, 579 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter Elliott II].
82. Elliott I, 542 So. 2d at 392.
83. Id. at 393. As an aside, it appears that the risk of primary HIV infection (the pre-
cursor to AIDS) from ingesting contaminated foods is vanishingly small. The only
documented cases of oral HIV transmission from food involved infants ingesting food that
was “pre-chewed” by infected caregivers. See, e.g., Pepsi Contaminated with HIV, SNOPES,
http://www.snopes.com/food/tainted/pepsihiv.asp (last updated May 15, 2014).
84. Elliott I, 542 So. 2d at 393.
85. Elliott II, 579 So. 2d at 829.
86. Id. at 828. The style of the case refers to the first named appellee, Richard Dugger,
then Secretary of Corrections.
87. Elliott I, 542 So. 2d at 392.
88. Id.
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due” to him.89 The trial court granted summary judgment, refusing to
consider Elliott’s testimony.90 On appeal, the First District Court of
Appeal reversed, noting that the lack of evidence as to the content of
the letter precluded summary judgment:
We are not at this point attempting to construe the meaning of the
alleged representation made by appellee that no benefits were due
claimant, which representation could have meant, for instance, ei-
ther that the Department of Corrections was of the opinion that
there had yet been no injury shown, or that it had taken the posi-
tion that Elliott had no right to claim benefits because the injury
was not a covered injury. That latter interpretation is suggested in
paragraph 19 of the Elliotts’ complaint as above referenced and, for
purposes of a motion for summary judgment, must be taken as true.
Moreover, if appellee denied workers’ compensation coverage on the
basis that Robert Elliott’s alleged injury was not encompassed
within the Act or on the basis that he was injured under other situ-
ations not covered by the Act, the Elliotts were free to pursue
common law remedies. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the
trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judg-
ment on the basis that there exist genuine issues of material fact
concerning the issue of estoppel.91
Elliott apparently did institute workers’ compensation litigation dur-
ing the pendency of the first appeal.92 The deputy commissioner ruled
that he sustained a compensable accident.93 However, the deputy com-
missioner held that no benefits were due other than payment for the
prior blood testing.94 Thereafter, the employer again moved for sum-
mary judgment in the civil action (which was again before the trial
court on remand).95 This time, summary judgment was granted, and
the First District upheld, relying on the deputy commissioner’s hold-
ing, that Elliott had sustained a covered accident but no benefits were
due.96
The court subsequently derived a clearer rule from its Elliott
holdings in Schroeder v. Peoplease Corp.97 Schroeder is now arguably
the leading case on point, because it establishes the proposition that
89. Id. at 393.
90. Id.
91. Elliott I, 542 So. 2d at 394 (internal citations omitted).





97. Schroeder v. Peoplease Corp., 18 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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mere ambiguity in the language of a denial precludes summary judg-
ment for the employer/defendant:
Here, as in Elliott, there remain disputed issues of material fact as
to the meaning of the language employed in the notice of denial.
Summary judgment is inappropriate where the wording of a docu-
ment is ambiguous and its interpretation involves questions of fact.
Whether estoppel is appropriate in this case and whether the em-
ployer took irreconcilable positions is dependent upon the meaning
to be accorded the notice of denial.98
2. Other Florida District Courts
The Second District Court of Appeal adopted the rules laid
down in Byerley, Kent, and Elliott in Coca-Cola Enters. v. Montiel:99
Aquilino J. Montiel suffered a back injury while unloading
Coca–Cola products at a Tampa Kash N’ Karry store. Unquestiona-
bly, the injury occurred in the course and scope of Mr. Montiel’s
employment. Mr. Montiel’s deposition testimony also establishes
that Coca–Cola paid workers’ compensation benefits to him for
about twelve weeks. Thereafter, Coca–Cola denied further workers’
compensation benefits. The medical evidence indicated that Mr.
Montiel’s condition no longer related to his work injury, but to a
degenerative condition. Mr. Montiel did not claim further benefits
under the workers’ compensation statute.100 Instead, he sued
Coca–Cola and Kash N’ Karry for negligence, alleging that im-
proper shelving design caused his injury. Coca–Cola sought
summary judgment based on workers’ compensation exclusivity
. . . .
Neither Byerley nor Elliott presents facts similar to those before us.
Mr. Montiel’s injury was work-related. Coca–Cola never contended
otherwise. Coca–Cola paid benefits for approximately three
months. Indeed, Coca–Cola denied further benefits only when medi-
cal evidence indicated that Mr. Montiel’s condition no longer
related to his work injury. Had Mr. Montiel thought himself enti-
tled to further benefits, the statute provided a vehicle to seek
relief.101 We are aware of no statutory provision that, under these
circumstances, strips the employer of the exclusivity defense. To
read such a result into the statute would be contrary to the purpose
of the law.102
98. Id. at 1170 (internal citations omitted).
99. Coca-Cola Enters. v. Montiel, 985 So. 2d 19, 19-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
100. See FLA. STAT. § 440.192.
101. Id.
102. Coca-Cola Enters., 985 So. 2d at 19-20.
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Montiel is significant because it makes reference to a particular de-
fense (“Mr. Montiel’s condition no longer related to his work injury
. . .”), and held that the defense was not inconsistent with the later
assertion of immunity. Essentially, this was the same holding reached
by the Fifth District in Kent, but more elegantly phrased. Rather than
deeming the defense to be “a recognized defense to a claim for comp
benefits,” the Montiel Court distinguished it from denying that a work-
related injury had occurred. Montiel essentially applied a logical
bright-line rule that the employer’s position on compensability was the
determining factor in whether it could later assert immunity.103
The leading case on point in the Third District is Coastal Ma-
sonry, Inc. v. Gutierrez.104 Gutierrez allegedly suffered a lifting injury
to his lower back at work, and filed a petition for benefits.105 The em-
ployer’s insurer filed a response denying the claim, and asserting, inter
alia, that:
The carrier has denied the claim in its entirety . . . . The present
condition of the claimant is not the result of an injury by accident
arising out of and in the course and scope of employment. There is
no accident or occupational disease. The condition complained of is
not the result of an injury, as defined by Florida Statute
§ 440.02(1).106
Gutierrez dismissed his workers’ compensation claim and proceeded
against the employer in tort.107 Predictably, the employer defended on
immunity grounds, and moved for summary judgment.108 The Third
District first held that the employer’s positions were patently
inconsistent:
Coastal denied Gutierrez’s claim for workers’ compensation bene-
fits, stating that “[t]he present condition of the claimant is not the
result of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course and
scope of employment.” In this case, however, Coastal asserted as an
affirmative defense that it was entitled to the exclusivity defense
103. Recall, as set forth in supra note 17, that compensability merely refers to the ques-
tion of whether a work-related accident occurred.
104. Coastal Masonry, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 30 So. 3d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
105. Id. at 547.
106. Id. Gutierrez is thus distinguishable from most of the cases discussed above be-
cause the plaintiff had actually instituted litigation of his workers’ compensation claim,
rather than relying on a pre-litigation denial.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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because the accident arose in the course and scope of Gutierrez’s
employment.109
The court then applied the three-element test for equitable estoppel,
and held that Gutierrez’ voluntary dismissal of the workers’ compensa-
tion action satisfied the detrimental reliance requirement.110 The
denial of summary judgment was affirmed.111 The court also noted,
consistent with Kent, et al., that mere denial of a workers’ compensa-
tion claim was not sufficient to invoke estoppel.112
The leading Fourth District case is Mena v. J.I.L. Const. Group
Corp.113 Mena serves as a handy summary of the preceding decisions:
[U]nder Florida law, where injuries are not encompassed within our
Worker’s Compensation Act, the employee is free to pursue his or
her common law remedies. Further, where an employer denies a
claim for worker’s compensation benefits on the basis that the in-
jury did not occur in the course and scope of employment, or that
there was no employment relationship, the employer may be es-
topped from asserting in a later tort action that the worker’s
exclusive remedy was worker’s compensation, provided that the
employee can satisfy the elements of estoppel. For the possibility of
estoppel to arise, however, the employer’s assertion of worker’s
compensation immunity must be “clearly irreconcilable” with the
reason for its initial denial. If the language employed in the notice
of denial could give rise to more than one interpretation, such that
it cannot be fairly determined whether the employer’s positions are
inconsistent, summary judgment is inappropriate.
In Schroeder, the employer’s notice of denial listed six different rea-
sons. Two of the reasons stated, “The present condition of claimant
is not the result of injury arising out of and in the course of his or
her employment,” and “The condition complained of is not the re-
sult of an injury within the meaning of the term as used in the
Florida Compensation Act.” The other four reasons suggested that
the denial was based on a preexisting condition of the employee.
The First District reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judg-
ment, holding “[w]hether estoppel is appropriate in this case and
whether the employer took irreconcilable positions is dependent
upon the meaning to be accorded the notice of denial.”114
109. Id. at 548. The court also noted that the employer had taken inconsistent positions
within the negligence proceeding, as it had denied that Gutierrez was its employee in its
answer to Gutierrez’ complaint.
110. Gutierrez, 30 So. 3d at 548.
111. Id. at 549.
112. Id. at 547. Accord Fly & Form, Inc. v. Marquez, 19 So. 3d 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2009) (heard in the Third District).
113. Mena v. J.I.L. Const. Group Corp., 79 So. 3d 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
114. Id. at 222-23 (internal citations omitted).
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3. Federal Cases
The decisions of federal courts in this area are of questionable
value and sparse (in fact, there are just three of note). This is perhaps
unsurprising, given that Florida’s own courts have rendered relatively
little relevant decisional law.
In Ashby v. Nat’l Freight, Inc., the plaintiff reported a work-
related injury to his employer.115 The claims administrator, citing lack
of timely notice, denied the claim.116 The plaintiff then proceeded
against the employer in tort.117 In granting summary judgment for the
employer, the court noted that the employer was not estopped from
asserting immunity because it did not take inconsistent positions.118 It
had denied his claim only on the notice defense, and never disputed
that an industrial injury occurred.119
More problematic is the recent decision by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit in Picon v. Gallagher Bassett Servs.120 In
Picon, the employee/plaintiff reported a repetitive motion injury to her
employer, which authorized benefits including medical care.121 After
six months of conservative care, the authorized treating physician rec-
ommended surgery.122 The employer exercised its right to an
evaluation by another doctor,123 who opined that the injury was not
causally related to the employee’s job duties, and that no further treat-
ment was necessary “under the workers’ compensation accident.”124
The employer denied authorization for the proposed operation and all
115. Ashby v. Nat’l Freight, Inc., No. 809-CV-582-T-30MAP, 2009 WL 1767620, at *1
(M.D. Fla. June 23, 2009).
116. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 440.185(1) provides that claims are barred if not reported to em-
ployers within thirty days, absent certain enumerated exceptions.
117. Ashby, 2009 WL 1767620, at *3.
118. Id.
119. Id. Though consistent with the Florida appellate decisions, Ashby is curious be-
cause it makes repeated references to judicial estoppel. The facts of the case clearly raised
the issue of ordinary estoppel, since the workers’ compensation claim was not litigated to
conclusion. Furthermore, the court cited and applied the estoppel test from Kent. The Third
District has cited Ashby on two occasions, including an erroneous reference to judicial estop-
pel. Judicial estoppel will be discussed further below as an alternative remedy.
120. 548 Fed. Appx. 561 (11th Cir. 2013).
121. Id. at 563.
122. Id.
123. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(5) allows the employee or employer to have an independent
medical examination (“IME”) performed by a physician of the party’s choice if it disputes the
opinion of the authorized treating physician. The term IME is somewhat misleading, be-
cause the IME physician is deemed the party’s expert.
124. Picon, 548 Fed. Appx. at 564.
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further benefits, relying on the second doctor’s opinion.125 The em-
ployee filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits.126 The
employer did not file a Notice of Denial or response to the petition.127
However, its attorney advised the employee’s attorney of the IME phy-
sician’s opinion, and the employer’s intent to rely on the opinion.128
The employee then dismissed the petition, citing the employer’s alleged
position that her injury was “not related to her employment,” and filed
suit against the employer in tort.129 The civil action was removed to
federal court by the employer, which then successfully moved for sum-
mary judgment in the trial court.130 The employee/plaintiff then
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.
That court first undertook an exhaustive review of the case law,
including the cases discussed above and Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v.
Wilczewski.131 It then focused on the ambiguity issue discussed in
Schroeder, noting that “[w]hen the record reveals multiple possible ex-
planations for the denial, or the language in the denial document is
ambiguous and gives rise to more than one interpretation, issues of
material fact exist [precluding summary judgment].”132 The court went
on to reverse, holding as follows:
Gallagher’s [attorney’s] emails, viewed in the light most favorable
to Picon, can be construed as denying the existence of an incident
occurring in the course and scope of employment. For example, Gal-
lagher’s attorney wrote that Picon’s “shoulder condition is
unrelated to her work activities.” Likewise, Gallagher’s senior
claims representative Roth wrote that “no further shoulder treat-
ment will be authorized as Dr. Blinn did not feel her shoulder
complaints were related to her job duties.” Dr. Blinn himself wrote
“it is not reasonable to state that using a mouse or computer at a
workstation in a repetitive fashion is the reason for this persons
[sic] right shoulder problem.” We do not conclude that estoppel ap-
plies here as a matter of law. We determine only that there were
genuine issues of material fact as to what were Gallagher’s reason
or reasons for the denial of Picon’s request for workers’ compensa-
tion benefits. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting






130. Picon, 548 Fed. Appx. at 564.
131. Id. at 572 (citing Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012) (heard in the Third District)).
132. Id.
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based on its workers’ compensation exclusivity affirmative
defense.133
Essentially, the court seems to have inferred that a dispute over causal
connection was tantamount to ambiguity regarding compensability.
This was questionable for two reasons. First, the employer never took
the position that the claim was not compensable (even if the physi-
cian’s words are directly imputed to it.) Dr. Blinn’s finding could either
mean that the employee’s condition was preexisting, or that it was the
result of a subsequent accident. It was not reasonable to infer that the
employer/carrier might be claiming that no compensable accident had
occurred. Second, when the claim was denied, the employer no longer
had the right to contest compensability. Under Section 440.20(4) of the
Florida Statutes, an employer that does not deny compensability
within 120 days of its first payment of benefits waives its right to dis-
pute compensability at a later date.134 Having paid benefits to the
employee for six months, the employer could no longer contest that she
sustained an accident arising out of the course and scope of employ-
ment, “unless [it could] establish material facts relevant to the issue of
compensability that it could not have discovered through reasonable
investigation within the 120-day period.”135 Thus, while the Picon
court teased out the correct rule of law, it seemingly misapplied it.
In Rush v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.,136 the em-
ployee/plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim based on “sick
building syndrome.”137 She then filed another claim alleging the same
conditions, with a different date of accident and/or disablement date.138
The employer/defendant denied her workers’ compensation claims, as-
serting in part that “Claimant’s alleged exposure . . . did not occur in
the course and scope of her employment and Claimant did not suffer an
injury by accident . . . . Claimant’s conditions are personal in nature
and longstanding and unrelated to her employment.”139 The employee
133. Id. at 573.
134. FLA. STAT. § 440.20 (2013) (“A carrier that fails to deny compensability within 120
days after the initial provision of benefits . . . waives the right to deny compensability, un-
less the carrier can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that it
could not have discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period.”).
135. Id. Accordingly, there is no competent substantial evidence supporting the JCC’s
findings and the determination that the e/c was not estopped to deny the compensability of
appellant’s claims.
136. 773 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
137. Sick building syndrome generally refers to conditions arising in building occupants
as a result of indoor air quality issues, both chemical and organic. See, e.g., Lesley King
O’Neal et al., Sick Building Claims, 20 CONSTR. LAWYER 16, 16-17 (2000).
138. Rush, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
139. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\10-2\FAM202.txt unknown Seq: 25 22-APR-16 13:10
2015 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IMMUNITY 333
then dismissed the workers’ compensation claims and proceeded in
tort.140 The employer moved for summary judgment, but not on the
basis of workers’ compensation immunity (though it did assert immu-
nity as an affirmative defense).141 Instead, it primarily argued that
policy considerations mandated that the workers’ compensation claim
be litigated to conclusion before the JCC prior to the filing of a civil
action.142 The District Court rejected this argument, holding that the
facts of the case fit squarely within the requirements for estoppel.143
“Here, BellSouth—in the workers’ compensation setting—denied that
the claim was within the course and scope of Rush’s employment. In so
doing, BellSouth took the position that the Workers’ Compensation
Law was inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claim.”144 The District Court
also rejected the underlying policy argument.145
Other federal courts have discussed Section 440.11 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, but none of the other cases directly touch on the
immunity issue.146
B. A Bright-Line Rule?
So, what conclusions may we draw from the foregoing cases?
Kent, notwithstanding the mere fact that a defense is “recognized”
under the Workers’ Compensation Act, does not insulate the employer
from claims of estoppel. As noted above, both the lack of an employ-
ment relationship and the absence of an accident are recognized
defenses.147 However, the assertion of either of these defenses explic-
itly conflicts with a subsequent claim that an injury falls within the
scope of the Act. In other words, if the employer does not admit that an
accident occurred, and that it occurred at work, it cannot be immune
from suit.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1262.
142. Id. at 1263. This argument was based on certain legislative policy statements refer-
enced in the Kent decision (see supra note 59).
143. Id. at 1264.
144. Rush, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1264.
145. “Policy decisions, however, are for the legislature, not the courts.” Id.
146. See, e.g., Sinni v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(discussing application of FLA. STAT. § 440.11 in context of purported breach of liability in-
surer’s duty to defend). Other cases generally relate to the intentional tort exception.
147. E.g., Jenks v. Bynum Transp., Inc., 104 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (hold-
ing that a truck driver receiving unpaid training prior to hire was an “employee” for
workers’ compensation purposes); Vigliotti v. K-mart Corp., 680 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that an accident sustained by an employee who had clocked out but not
left employer’s premises arose out of employment).
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What distinguishes these two defenses from all others available
under the Act? The answer is simple: compensability.148 How is com-
pensability determined? The Act itself offers little direct guidance.
The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required
by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable
injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the
scope of employment. The injury, its occupational cause, and any
resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant
medical findings, and the accidental compensable injury must be
the major contributing cause of any resulting injuries.149
Despite setting forth definitions for nearly all terms of art used in the
Act, neither Section 440.02 of the Florida Statutes nor any other sec-
tion explicitly defines compensability. The definition can be found only
by reference to case law.
As to the question of what the legislature intended by the term
“compensability” in the context of sections 440.192 and 440.20 [of
the Florida Statutes], we note that section 440.20(1) refers to “com-
pensability or entitlement to benefits,” indicating that they are
separate concepts, and that the last sentence of section 440.20(4)
refers to “the issue of compensability,” indicating a distinction from
other issues. Having reviewed the uses of the terms “compen-
sability” and “compensable” in the various sections of chapter 440,
we conclude that “compensability” in the context of sections 440.192
and 440.20 is limited to a determination of whether the injury for
which benefits are claimed arose out of, and occurred within the
course and scope of, the claimant’s employment.150
The determination of whether or not compensability has been denied is
generally an easy one, since it will be reflected in writing in the records
of the workers’ compensation claim. Helpfully, denials typically track
the language of the statute.151
148. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
149. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1).
150. N. River Ins. Co. v. Wuelling, 683 So. 2d 1090, 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
151. As discussed above, an employer that denies either compensability or entitlement
to a specific benefit must file a “Notice of Denial.” See supra note 19. It is irrelevant whether
the claim is in litigation. In most of the cases discussed above, the estoppel argument rested
on the grounds for denial listed in that document. In others, such as Kent and Gutierrez, the
estoppel argument was based on language taken from responses to petitions for benefits.
Unlike the Notice of Denial, the response—as the name suggests—is filed only to dispute
the claims in a petition, and is therefore only seen during litigation.
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III. OTHER ELEMENTS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
The foregoing discussion has been devoted to just one element
of equitable estoppel, inconsistent defensive positions taken by employ-
ers. We have not discussed the other three elements of equitable
estoppel. Are those elements as crystallized in the case law as they
appear?
Outside the workers’ compensation setting, the courts of Florida
are unanimous in the view that equitable estoppel arises only in ex-
traordinary circumstances. “[A] party may successfully maintain a suit
under the theory of equitable estoppel only where there is proof of
fraud, misrepresentation, or other affirmative deception.”152 “Equita-
ble estoppel differs from other legal theories that may operate upon the
statutes of limitation in that equitable estoppel presupposes an act of
wrongdoing—such as fraud and concealment—that prejudices a
party’s case . . . .”153 “Equitable estoppel presupposes a legal shortcom-
ing in a party’s case that is directly attributable to the opposing party’s
misconduct.”154 “Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which is applied only
where to refuse its application would be virtually to sanction the perpe-
tration of a fraud.”155
In other words, the adverse party’s representation must have
been misleading rather than merely incorrect. There was no evidence
of deception in any of the cases discussed in Section II. Strangely, there
was not even any discussion of deception as a condition precedent for
estoppel. It could hardly be said that a defendant asserting inconsis-
tent defenses is guilty of “misconduct,” much less fraud or
concealment. If so, nearly every injured worker would find himself es-
topped when he asserted alternative claims for lost wage benefits.156
152. Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Sarasota, 361 So.
2d 156, 159 (Fla. 1978).
153. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. S.A.P., 835 So. 2d 1091, 1097 (Fla. 2002).
154. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1077 (Fla. 2001).
155. Brickell Bay Club Condo. Ass’n v. Hernstadt, 512 So. 2d 994, 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (heard in the Third District); accord Pelican Island Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Mur-
phy, 554 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (heard in the Second District).
156. Broadly speaking, Florida workers’ compensation law recognizes four categories of
indemnity or lost wage benefits: temporary partial disability benefits, temporary total disa-
bility benefits, permanent impairment benefits, and permanent total disability benefits.
FLA. STAT. § 440.13 (2015). Under no circumstances can an employee receive more than one
form of lost wage benefits for any given period of lost time. However, nearly every wage-loss
petition for benefits filed seeks both temporary partial and temporary total benefits, and
petitions may even request all four benefit types, with the specific benefit periods further
defined as litigation continues.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\10-2\FAM202.txt unknown Seq: 28 22-APR-16 13:10
336 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 10:2:309
As an equitable doctrine, a court may find that fairness or pol-
icy considerations justify relaxing the predicate for estoppel in certain
circumstances. Assuming, arguendo, that the unique nature of work-
ers’ compensation claims is such a consideration, the misconduct
requirement could be excused. However, the reliance requirement is
also more complex than the cases above might indicate. “Estoppel . . .
cannot exist where the parties have equal knowledge of the facts or the
same means of ascertaining that knowledge.”157 “A claim of reliance
[as an element of an estoppel] must fail where both parties have equal
knowledge of the truth.”158 In almost any employment litigation, the
employer is likely to have superior knowledge of the facts (like any in-
stitutional party). However, where the issue is merely whether a
compensable accident occurred, the employee has at least as much in-
formation as the employer. The employee is the only party who will
almost always have been an eyewitness to an accident.159 Moreover,
the employee will certainly have all the facts necessary to determine
compensability.160 Thus, there is no reason to credit a claim of reliance.
A third consideration is that the party claiming estoppel must
have relied on the representation in changing position to its detri-
ment.161 When an employer denies compensability, the employee has
not immediately suffered a detriment. The employee is free to file (or
refile) a workers’ compensation claim regardless of the employer’s posi-
tion.162 So long as the incident is reported to the employer within
thirty days,163 the employee may bring an action any time up to two
years from the accident date.164 Arguably, equitable estoppel might act
to extend this statute of limitations, but it is difficult to see why it is a
157. Murphy, 554 So. 2d at 1181.
158. Watson Clinic, LLP v. Verzosa, 816 So. 2d 832, 834 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (heard
in the Second District).
159. It is possible to conceive of circumstances where this might not be true, as in cases
where the employee loses consciousness before or during a workplace accident, or suffers
memory loss after one. Needless to say, such circumstances should be considered separately,
if at all.
160. For example, the mechanism of injury, what job duties were being performed at the
time of the accident, and where the accident occurred.
161. Anderson, 403 So. 2d at 400.
162. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 60Q-6.116(2) (2015) allows a party to dismiss any claim with-
out prejudice once, as a matter of right. A second voluntary dismissal operates as an
adjudication on the merits.
163. See FLA. STAT. § 440.185(1) (2015) (“An employee who suffers an injury arising out
of and in the course of employment shall advise his or her employer of the injury within
thirty days after the date of or initial manifestation of the injury. Failure to so advise the
employer shall bar a petition under this chapter . . . .”).
164. The statute of limitations is extended by an additional year by the provision of any
benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The section also provides for another statu-
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detriment otherwise. Nor is an employee’s decision to seek medical
care outside the workers’ compensation system a detriment. Section
440.13(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes specifically provides that an em-
ployee may obtain her own care at the employer’s expense provided
that “she has requested the employer to furnish that initial treatment
or service and the employer has failed, refused, or neglected to do so
within a reasonable time . . . .” Once a claim is found compensable by a
JCC, the employee is no longer responsible for payment of any such
medical care.165
This arguably brings us full circle to Byerley. Recall that the
Byerley court asserted that the employer created a “Hobson’s choice”
for the employee.166 At first blush, this seems like a compelling ratio-
nale. The reader is invited to believe that the employee was “damned if
she did, and damned if she did not.” In fact, however, the employee was
simply being forced to litigate her workers’ compensation claim like
any other claimant that is denied benefits.
Returning to the facts,167 it is hard to escape the conclusion that
Byerley’s workers’ compensation claim would have been meritorious.
She was injured on a sidewalk while leaving the employer’s premises
at the end of her workday. Ordinarily, accidents which occur while
traveling to or from work are not compensable under the “going and
coming” rule.168 However, the rule does not apply to most accidents
which occur on the employer’s premises.169 The sidewalk where By-
erley was injured was on the employer’s premises.170 Although she was
engaged in a personal activity at the time of the accident (picking up
some empty boxes), this was a de minimis departure from her ordinary
route home.171 Had she pursued her workers’ compensation claim, she
tory estoppel if the employer fails to advise the employee of his rights under the Act,
including the two years statute of limitations. See FLA. STAT. § 440.19(1) (2015).
165. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(13)(a) (2015) provides that “[a] health care provider may not
collect or receive a fee from an injured employee within this state, except as otherwise pro-
vided by this chapter. Such providers have recourse against the employer or carrier for
payment for services rendered in accordance with this chapter.”
166. Byerley, 725 So. 2d at 1232. Similarly, in Kent, the employee argued (albeit unsuc-
cessfully) that he was being “whipsawed” out of any remedy. Kent, 966 So. 2d at 981-82.
167. See “A v. B & C” supra Part II.A.
168. See, e.g., Doctor’s Bus. Serv. v. Clark, 498 So. 2d 659, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
169. Carnegie Gardens Nursing Ctr. v. Banyai, 852 So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (heard in the Fifth District) (“An injury is deemed to have occurred in the course and
scope of employment if it is sustained by a worker, on the employer’s premises, while pre-
paring to begin a day’s work or while doing other acts which are preparatory or incidental to
performance of his or her duties, and which are reasonably necessary for such purpose.”).
170. Byerley, 725 So. 2d at 1231.
171. Id. E.g., Johns v. State Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 485 So. 2d 857 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) (deciding that a hospital employee who arrived twenty minutes early to work
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would most likely have been awarded benefits. “If this were a workers’
compensation proceeding and the deputy commissioner were to deny
benefits by finding that the appellant was not within the course and
scope of her employment, we would be compelled to reverse.”172 Not
only that, but fully litigating the case before a JCC would ensure that
there was no ambiguity in the position taken by the employer/carrier,
and would provide clarity of fact.
In the absence of detrimental reliance, a finding of estoppel is
inappropriate. Thus, the employee should be required to litigate the
merits of the workers’ compensation claim. That litigation should itself
supply the necessary preclusive effect under the doctrine of judicial
estoppel.
IV. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
As we have seen, equitable estoppel prevents a party from tak-
ing inconsistent positions when the adverse party has relied on the
original representation. The closely related doctrine of judicial estoppel
prevents a party from taking inconsistent positions in judicial proceed-
ings.173 Florida follows the Corpus Juris formulation of the doctrine:
In order to work and estoppel the position assumed in the former
trial must have been successfully maintained. In proceedings termi-
nating in a judgment, the positions must be clearly inconsistent,
the parties must be the same and the same questions must be in-
volved. So, the party claiming the estoppel must have been misled
and have changed his position; and an estoppel is not raised by con-
duct of one party to a suit, unless by reason thereof the other party
has been so placed as to make it unjust to him to allow the first
party to [subsequently] change his position.174
This version differs from that adopted in some jurisdictions in that it
only applies between proceedings; no estoppel is wrought by a party’s
inconsistent positions taken within a proceeding (for example, conflict-
ing statements made in a deposition and at a subsequent trial).175
and was assaulted was in the course and scope of employment and not entitled to sue her
employer in tort; arriving early was “reasonably incident to her employment.”); accord Perez
v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 673 So. 2d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reasoning that an
employee who “had clocked out” and was injured “while on her way out of the store” was
within the course and scope of her employment.). See also Vigliotti v. K-mart Corp., 680 So.
2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
172. Johns, 485 So. 2d at 859.
173. See Rand G. Boyers, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial
Estoppel, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1244, 1244 (1986).
174. Chase & Co. v. Little, 156 So. 609, 610-11 (Fla. 1934).
175. See Boyers, supra note 173, at 1265.
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Other jurisdictions may also differ in whether they apply the “prior
success” rule; that is, the requirement that the estopped party has
“successfully maintained” its position at the earlier proceeding.176 We
can draw out the following elements: (1) successful maintenance of (2)
a clearly inconsistent position (3) in a prior case involving the same
parties and questions, (4) which causes the adverse party to change
position.177
The leading Florida Supreme Court decision on judicial estoppel
is instructive. In Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company,
storeowner Blumberg closed his business and stored leftover stock at
his home.178 Fearing theft, he contacted his insurance agent to confirm
that his homeowner’s insurance policy covered the additional items
(valuable collectible trading cards).179 His agent confirmed that the
policy would cover such a loss.180 The same day, thieves broke into the
home and the cards were taken.181 The insurer denied the resulting
homeowners’ policy claim and litigation ensued.182 Blumberg asserted
that the insurer was estopped from denying coverage because
Blumberg had orally relied on the agent’s representation; he would
have stored the cards elsewhere or obtained additional coverage but for
the agent’s declaration.183 Blumberg prevailed at the ensuing jury
trial, but the jury awarded him less than a pretrial settlement offer.184
Under Florida’s “offer of judgment” rule, the insurer, thereby, became
entitled to recover its attorney fees.185 The parties entered into a mu-
tual stipulation dismissing their claims against one another, leaving
176. Id. at 1246 et seq.
177. The Fourth District Court of Appeal offers the following alternative formulation:
A claim or position successfully maintained in a former action or judicial proceeding
bars a party from making a completely inconsistent claim or taking a clearly conflict-
ing position in a subsequent action or judicial proceeding, to the prejudice of the
adverse party, where the parties are the same in both actions.
JSZ Fin. Co. v. Whipple, 939 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Grau v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 396, 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
178. 790 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 2001).
179. Id.




184. Blumberg, 790 So. 2d at 1066.
185. A defendant which tenders an offer to settle a civil action, and whose offer is de-
nied, is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs expended after that date if the plaintiff
is ultimately awarded 25% less than the offer. Similarly, a plaintiff whose demand is re-
jected is entitled to fees and costs if the final award is 25% more than the demand. FLA.
STAT. §§ 768.79(6)(a)-(b) (2015).
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them status quo (other than Blumberg’s uncompensated loss).186
Blumberg then filed a new suit against the insurance agent on the
ground that the agent negligently failed to obtain adequate homeown-
ers’ coverage.187 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the agent on estoppel grounds.188 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
affirmed.189
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court noted that Blumberg
had taken clearly incompatible positions in the two proceedings. In the
first suit, he asserted that insurance coverage existed and he was enti-
tled to recover under it.190 In the second, he asserted that no coverage
existed due to the agent’s negligence.191 The court then discussed pol-
icy considerations for the judicial estoppel doctrine:
Blumberg is attempting “to make a mockery out of justice” by as-
serting inconsistent positions in the St. Paul suit (where he claimed
that coverage existed and prevailed) and the Bruner suit (where he
claimed that coverage did not exist) . . . .
The courthouse should not be viewed as an all-you-can-sue buffet,
in which litigants can pick and choose which verdicts they want and
which they do not. Blumberg certainly had the option to voluntarily
dismiss the promissory estoppel claim after he received a successful
jury verdict. But after receiving that successful verdict, he did not
have the option of pursuing an entirely inconsistent position in a
subsequent suit.192
In holding that judicial estoppel barred Blumberg’s second suit, the
court noted that he litigated the first claim to a successful conclusion
on the merits.193 The subsequent voluntary dismissal of his claim did
not “erase” the jury’s verdict.194 The court noted that mutuality of par-
ties was not a strict requirement for judicial estoppel, and that “special
186. Blumberg, 790 So. 2d at 1063.
187. Id. The homeowners’ insurance carrier Blumberg sued was St. Paul Fire & Marine,
not USAA. USAA was the liability carrier for Bruner Insurance Agency, the direct defen-
dant in the second suit.
188. Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 96-13505, 1998 WL 35231332, at *1 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Apr. 3, 1998). The trial court also found for the defendant on the basis of a statute of
limitations issue not relevant here.
189. Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 729 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(heard in the Fourth District).
190. Blumberg, 790 So. 2d at 1063.
191. Blumberg, 729 So. 2d at 461.
192. Blumberg, 790 So. 2d at 1066-67.
193. Id. at 1067.
194. Id.
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fairness and policy considerations” dictated that it was not required in
the instant case.195
Federal courts have taken a similar view of the purposes of the
doctrine to those espoused by the Blumberg court:
To protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties
from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of
the moment . . . . Judicial estoppel is a doctrine intended to prevent
the perversion of the judicial process . . . and the essential integrity
of the judicial process . . . [and] prevents parties from playing “fast
and loose with the courts.”196
The primary distinction between judicial estoppel and generic equita-
ble estoppel is the reliance element. For judicial estoppel to apply, the
party claiming estoppel need not have relied on the estopped party’s
position. Instead, the position must have been successfully maintained;
we might say that the court must have relied on it, rather than the
adverse party. This is consistent with the different policies underlying
the two doctrines: while judicial estoppel “protects the integrity of the
judicial process,” equitable estoppel “protects litigants from less than
scrupulous opponents.”197
A. Instead of Equitable Estoppel, Courts Should Find Judicial
Estoppel when the Facts Warrant
In construing any provision of the workers’ compensation
scheme, it is important to remember the underlying purpose of the Act:
“quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an
injured worker and to facilitate the worker’s return to gainful reem-
ployment at a reasonable cost to the employer.”198 Put another way,
the underlying policy goal is speedy delivery of benefits, returning em-
ployees to work, and low cost.
The workers’ compensation system operates much more quickly
than traditional courts, a fact borne out both by the law and statistics.
By statutory mandate, the OJCC is required to conduct a merits hear-
ing no later than 210 days from the filing of a petition for benefits.199
195. Id. The court did not elaborate on the specific considerations at issue, but it can be
inferred that the court was referring to the agency relationship. That is, the insurance agent
that stood in the shoes of the insurer to bind it to coverage (in the original suit) must also
have stood in the insurer’s shoes when defending the second suit.
196. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
197. Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982).
198. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2015). See discussion supra notes 10-11.
199. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4)(d) (“The final hearing shall be held within 210 days after
receipt of the petition for benefits. . . .”). This requirement may be waived by the parties only
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No such mandate exists for civil actions, but the Florida Supreme
Court has adopted twelve months as a “presumptively reasonable”
time for resolution of a non-jury civil trial.200 In 2013, the average
length of time between the filing of a petition and a merits hearing was
162 days.201 The Florida circuit courts do not keep comparable statis-
tics, but nationwide, the average tort action took over two years to
reach disposition as of 2001.202
The quick resolution of disputes operates to return employees to
“gainful employment” more quickly and more often. The odds of a given
individual returning to work after a period of disability decrease
sharply with the length of the disability.203 Without workers’ compen-
sation benefits, injured workers are likely to have no or limited access
to remedial care. Moreover, an employer being sued in tort is highly
unlikely to allow the employee to return to work. Conversely, an em-
ployer/carrier, which is providing workers’ compensation benefits, has
a strong incentive to offer modified duty work—if only to reduce its
liability for temporary partial disability benefits.204 It should also be
noted that injured workers are more likely to prevail in workers’ com-
for good cause, though in this author’s experience, the good cause requirement is inter-
preted liberally.
200. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.250(a)(1)(B). A presumptively reasonable time to conclude a
jury trial is eighteen months. Given the lack of a jury in workers’ compensation proceedings,
it seems reasonable to use the non-jury period as the primary basis for comparison.
201. OFFICE OF THE JUDGES OF COMPENSATION CLAIMS, 2012-2013 ANNUAL REPORT 40,
available at http://www.fljcc.org/jcc/files/reports/2013AnnualReport/files/assets/common/
downloads/OJCC%202013%20Annual%20Report.pdf [hereinafter OJCC ANNUAL REPORT].
202. THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL TRIAL CASES
AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 8 (2004), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/ctcvlc01.pdf (“Tort trials reached a verdict or judgment in an average of 25.6
months compared to 21.7 months for real property cases and 21.5 months for contract
cases.”).
203. See, e.g., Preventing Needless Work Disability by Helping People Stay Employed, 48
J. ENVTL. MED. 972, 976 (2006), available at http://www.acoem.org/PreventingNeedless-
WorkDisability.aspx (“[T]he odds for return to full employment drop to 50/50 after 6 months
of absence. Even less encouraging is the finding that the odds of a worker ever returning to
work drop 50% by just the 12th week. The current practice of focusing disability manage-
ment effort on those who are already out of work rarely succeeds.”). See also Joan Crook &
Harvey Moldofsky, The Probability of Recovery and Return to Work from Work Disability as
a Function of Time, 3 QUALITY OF LIFE RES. S97 (1994) (“[[W]orkers in Canada with indus-
trial injuries] who remained absent from work after three months had a strong tendency to
remain absent for more extended periods.”).
204. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(4) (2015) provides that workers who are not totally disabled
but have medical restrictions receive wage loss benefits equal to 80% of the difference be-
tween their pre- and post-injury earnings.
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pensation proceedings as the standard of proof in most cases is lower
than the preponderance requirement found in tort actions.205
The last policy consideration (cost) also favors litigation in the
workers’ compensation arena. One survey indicates that nationwide,
the median hourly fee for a senior defense attorney practicing in civil
litigation is $275.00.206 Defense fees in workers’ compensation claims
are substantially lower. The fee paid to a claimant’s attorney may be
much higher than this figure,207 but this is solely a function of the con-
tingent nature of claimants’ attorneys’ fees.208 Generally, a claimant’s
attorney will be awarded no more than $300.00 per hour. Civil litigants
may call as many expert witnesses as the trial court will allow,
whereas workers’ compensation litigants are generally constrained to
calling a single expert, in addition to any treating physicians and pos-
sibly a court-appointed medical expert.209
Thus, all three policy goals of the Workers’ Compensation Act
are served by keeping litigation of “work accidents” within the purview
of the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims. It is important to
note that the District Courts have roundly rejected this argument
(though, as noted above, without reference to otherwise well-estab-
lished precedent).210 However, at least one Florida Supreme Court
Justice has followed the same line of reasoning:
205. The standard of proof on causation applied in workers’ compensation matters is
normally “a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Stokes v. Schindler Elevator Corp./
Broadspire, 60 So. 3d 1110, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). Other issues may be proven
merely by “competent, substantial evidence.” Schafrath v. Marco Bay Resort, Ltd., 608 So.
2d 97, 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). The meaning of this phrase is ambiguous at the trial
level, as it is normally a standard of review reserved for appellate proceedings. However, it
is unquestionably lower than the preponderance standard. Id. However, in occupational ex-
posure cases, the standard of proof of causation is clear and convincing evidence, a higher
standard than preponderance. See FLA. STAT. §440.151(1) (2015).
206. See Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litiga-
tion, 20 CT. STATS. PROJECT 1, 5 (2013), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/
microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.ashx.
207. In What An Idea, Inc. v. Sitko, 505 So. 2d 497, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), the
court upheld an award of a fee equivalent to $2,700.00 per hour.
208. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Albertson’s, Inc., 610 So. 2d 721, 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (“[W]e reject the suggestion that an award of fees to a claimant’s attorney should be
influenced or controlled by evidence of the hourly rate charged by defense lawyers. The
practice of the defense bar, with their fixed hourly rates, repetitive employment, and virtual
guaranteed payment by solvent insurance companies, cannot be compared to the risk as-
sumed by claimants’ attorneys in handling the appeals of workers’ compensation claimants.
For defense work, fees are usually paid when billed and deferred billing and collection is not
ordinarily a problem. Defense counsel also may recover costs the claimant’s attorney cannot,
and is paid for the time necessary to litigate the amount of the fee.”).
209. See discussion of IME statutory provision supra note 123.
210. E.g., Schroeder, 18 So. 3d at 1169 (“Peoplease and L & S argue that when the facts
make it clear that the employee suffered a workplace incident, then estoppel will never
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In order to give effect to the legislatively mandated workers’ com-
pensation immunity, the legal existence and applicability of that
immunity in individual cases should be able to be tested pretrial in
appellate review. Such a procedure is necessary to prevent workers’
compensation immunity from being seriously depreciated and this
integral part of the workers’ compensation system rendered worth-
less by reason of the expense and exposure of a jury trial. Our
decision in Turner v. PCR, Inc.,211 explains the quid pro quo out of
which this immunity came into existence but also has heightened
the need for pretrial review by broadening what can be pled as em-
ployee conduct that is not covered by workers’ compensation
immunity.212
Although Justice Wells, who retired in 2009,213 might not take the
same view here, the logic still applies: litigation of potential work inju-
ries by jury trial undercuts the purpose of the workers’ compensation
system.
Another consideration is that the easy availability of equitable
estoppel forces an employer to take a position more or less instantane-
ously. This is inconsistent with the self-administered design of the
workers’ compensation scheme.214 Employers are statutorily mandated
to investigate claims. Recall that the “120 day rule” of Section
440.20(4), Florida Statutes, provides, “[i]f the carrier is uncertain of its
obligation to provide all benefits or compensation, the carrier shall im-
mediately and in good faith commence investigation of the employee’s
entitlement to benefits under this chapter and shall admit or deny
compensability within 120 days . . . .” At the very least, employers
should not be estopped based on positions taken within the investiga-
tion period.
B. Litigation to a Conclusion on the Merits is Not
an Election of Remedies
As we have already seen, an employee who litigates compen-
sability of a workers’ compensation claim unsuccessfully would not
herself be subject to judicial estoppel on filing a subsequent tort action
apply despite what the employer and carrier may have said in the notice of denial. We can-
not agree.”); Mena, 79 So. 3d at 224 (“We note that . . . under the circumstances of this case
Mena was not required to litigate his claims to a final adjudication in the worker’s compen-
sation forum.”).
211. 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000).
212. Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 823 (Fla. 2004) (Wells, J.,
dissenting).
213. Justice Charles Talley Wells, FLA. SUPREME CT., http://www.floridasupremecourt
.org/justices/wells.shtml (last visited Aug. 23, 2015).
214. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2015).
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(given the requirement that the position have been successfully main-
tained).215 For that matter, an employee who sues in tort
unsuccessfully would also be so protected in bringing a subsequent
workers’ compensation claim.
The doctrine of election of remedies applies to workers’ compen-
sation claims,216 and might seem to prohibit the employee from
bringing a tort action after an unsuccessful workers’ compensation
claim (or vice versa). However, the courts have held that an alternative
cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff is found to be an em-
ployee—or not. “Florida follows the rule that either a dismissed or an
unsuccessful compensation claim does not bar a damage suit.”217
[E]lection of remedies by its very terms presupposes that a plaintiff
has at least two viable theories upon which recovery may be had.
That is not the case with respect to an injured employee. When in-
jury is suffered in the course and scope of employment, workers’
compensation is the exclusive remedy for recovery against the
employer.218
In other words, there can be no election of remedies until a determina-
tion is reached on the merits of one of the claims, since the other cause
of action is not yet mature. Thus, an employee who litigates his work-
ers’ compensation claim to a conclusion will not be deemed to have
elected his remedy unless he prevails.
C. Constitutional Issues
As a limitation on the right to recover provided at common law,
workers’ compensation immunity clearly has constitutional implica-
tions. In Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Smith, Section 440.11 of the
Florida Statutes was upheld in the face of a due process challenge
under Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution219 and, implicitly,
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.220
Arguably more pertinent is Article I, Section 21 of the Florida
Constitution, which provides that, “[t]he courts shall be open to every
215. Chase & Co., 156 So. at 610-11.
216. Williams v. Duggan, 153 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 1963).
217. Lowry v. Logan, 650 So. 2d 653, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
218. Id. at 658 (quoting Wishart v. Laidlaw Tree Serv., 573 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (heard in the Second District)).
219. 359 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1978).
220. Id. at 429-30. The Florida Supreme Court adopted the holding of Coates v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1951), in which the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act against a Fifth
Amendment due process challenge.
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person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay.” In Kluger v. White, the Florida Supreme
Court interpreted Section 21 to require that:
where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular in-
jury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of
the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida,
or where such right has become a part of the common law of the
State . . . the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right
without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of
the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature
can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of
such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public neces-
sity can be shown.221
In Eller v. Shova, the Florida Supreme Court applied the Kluger test to
Section 440.11, Florida Statutes, and found that it was not a denial of
access to the courts.222 It is not readily apparent why denial of equita-
ble estoppel based on the employer’s immediate post-accident position
requires a different result. Rejection of the equitable estoppel claim
merely requires the injured worker to litigate his claim in a different
forum—the essence of the workers’ compensation scheme.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that injured workers should be entitled to some pre-
clusion when their claims are deemed non-compensable under the
Workers’ Compensation Act. However, Florida’s appellate courts have
failed to consistently apply their own precedent when finding equitable
estoppel under the facts of such claims. Moreover, to find such preclu-
sion based on the positions taken by employers—rather than the
facts—undercuts the entire purpose of workers’ compensation
immunity.
Pursuant to Section 440.45 of the Florida Statutes, the OJCC is
headed by a Deputy Chief Judge. Judge David W. Langham has served
in that role since 2006, and makes the following observations on the
role of the workers’ compensation judiciary:
The Florida Office of Judges of Compensation Claims has adjudica-
tors who specialize in precisely the critical decisions required of this
analysis. The employer/employee relationship, compensability of
accidents and injuries, major contributing cause, and other statu-
tory constructs are issues that our judges analyze and adjudicate
regularly.
221. 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
222. 630 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1993).
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Judges of Compensation Claims have demonstrated an ability to
rapidly conclude consideration of workers’ compensation claims.
The delay resulting from civil court deference for consideration of
these issues would be reasonable. Such deference would result in
actual determination of the questions of law regarding the Act, and
relieve civil courts of the burden of conjecture regarding how such a
workers’ compensation claim might have hypothetically concluded.
The goal of the Act is to effectuate “quick and efficient” receipt of
statutory benefits. The Florida Office of Judges of Compensation
Claims has proven capable of delivering timely hearings and adju-
dications. The participation in that process may conclude with an
award of needed medical care and wage replacement benefits in an
approximately six month litigation process. One in which an in-
jured worker’s attorney fees for seeking such benefits are paid by
the employer/carrier instead of being recouped from the award or
settlement in a civil claim for damages.
The adjudication process for the Florida workers’ compensation sys-
tem is timely, efficient, and effective. Determinations are concluded
far more rapidly than in civil court proceedings. This comes in part
from specialization and concentration of the adjudicators. This also
comes in part from the administrative nature of the proceedings
and the statutory process that enables and compels it.223
Judge Langham’s view underscores the idea that the OJCC is the
proper forum for adjudication of disputes regarding workplace injuries.
Accordingly, when an employer denies that an employee-employer re-
lationship exists, or that an injury arose out of the course and scope of
employment, the parties should litigate the issue to conclusion in the
workers’ compensation arena. If a JCC finds that a claim is non-com-
pensable, such a finding should have preclusive effect in a subsequent
civil action. Whether the mechanisms for this preclusion are found in
the election of remedies doctrine, issue preclusion, or elsewhere, is a
matter for the courts to decide.
223. Correspondence from Deputy Chief Judge, Office of the Judges of Compensation
Claims David W. Langham, Florida Judge of Compensation Claims, to author (June 5,
2015) (on file with author).
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